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THE EFFECT OF GUILT ON COOPERATION IN THE ONE-SHOT ANONYMOUS PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA GAME 
 
Lawrence Ian Reed, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
 
 
There exists a wide body of literature suggesting that individuals behave more altruistically in situations 
that 1) provide an opportunity for reciprocation and 2) are not anonymous.  Past research investigating 
the altruistic functions of induced social emotions have been conducted solely in the context of either 
iterative and/or face-to-face interactions.  As a result, the altruistic behaviors found in these studies 
cannot be solely attributed to these induced emotions.  In light of these past works, the current study 
compared cooperation rates of individuals following either a guilt or neutral mood induction procedure 
in an anonymous, one-shot social dilemma (i.e. the prisoner’s dilemma).  Participants were 120 female 
undergraduates (60 engaged in a guilt induction procedure and 60 engaged in a neutral mood induction 
procedure) enrolled at a large university asked to participate in a one-shot social dilemma with a partner 
that they would never meet.  Primary analyses found no evidence regarding group differences in rates of 
cooperation.  Secondary analyses of subjective emotions ratings (i.e. guilt, happiness, sadness, anger, 
and fear) suggest that generalized negative affect may be associated with decreased rates of 
cooperation while positive affect may be associated with increase rates of cooperation.  Future research 
investigating the effects of generalized negative and positive affect as well as specifically induced 
emotions needs to be conducted to further evaluate this suggestion. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Despite decades of work in the fields of psychology, economics, and mathematics, volumes of 
empirical works have struggled to find a place for altruism in conceptualizations of social 
behavior.  Falling outside of the primarily accepted conceptual frameworks, altruistic behavior 
has remained at odds with many firmly established models of social behavior.  As a result, many 
instances of altruistic behavior are considered to be anomalies within larger models, while 
relatively larger questions remain  regarding their possible utility (Thaler, 1988).  The central 
aim of the current manuscript is to investigate the ways in which specific emotions, serving as 
proximate mechanisms, might influence altruistic behaviors in a social dilemma of specific 
causes and consequences. 
1.1 MODELS OF ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR 
The current context of cooperative behavior has changed dramatically from those existing 
during the past century.  Conceptualizations of altruistic behavior during the middle of the 20th 
century were dominated by formal models based on behaviors maximizing expected utility (De 
Cremer, Zeelenberg, & Murnighan, 2006).  These models, including rational choice theory (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), emphasize that 
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individuals behave in ways that pursue their own self-interests while protecting themselves 
from other individuals’ conflicting self-interested pursuits.  Furthermore, these models states 
that these selfish ends are achieved through social transactions and interactions (De Cremer et 
al., 2006).  More recently, works in the fields of psychology, economics, and mathematics have 
provided a great deal of insight towards the mechanisms of altruistic behavior.  Two prominent 
models have emerged: kin selection and reciprocal altruism. 
 The first model, kin selection, was developed by Hamilton (1964) who noted that related 
individuals share a proportion of their genes due to common descent.  Hamilton posited that as 
long as the benefit of an altruistic act to the relative (in relation to the degree of relatedness 
between the relatives) outweighs the harm to the individual (the cost of the altruistic act), 
genes causing the altruistic act will be selected for.  Thus, natural selection can increase the 
frequency of a gene in the population that causes an altruistic act because of the benefits to 
those individuals who have copies of that same gene. 
 The second model, termed reciprocal altruism, was presented by Trivers (1971) and 
rests on the notion “if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”.  In reciprocal altruism, altruistic 
acts are made in the expectation that similar acts will be returned in the future either directly 
(Trivers, 1971) or indirectly (Alexander, 1987).  The model posits that trading favors can yield a 
net reproductive benefit if both parties are cooperative. 
 Taken together, kin selection and reciprocal altruism explain a great deal of social 
behavior.  Kin selection, for example, provides a model for altruistic behavior in social insects 
such as ants and termites (Wilson, 1975) and provides an explanation for the striking finding 
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that infanticide is 80 times more likely to occur in families with a stepparent (Daly & Wilson, 
1987).  The discovery of reciprocal altruism has had a similar impact, providing explanations for 
seemingly altruistic behavior in cleaner fish (Trivers, 1971), to the paradoxical ‘live and let live’ 
systems found in trench warfare in World War I (Axelrod, 1984). 
 Although these two models provide an explanation for much altruistic and cooperative 
behavior, individuals often act altruistically towards non-relatives in situations where there is 
no chance of reciprocation.  For example, people routinely engage in behaviors such as 
returning wallets without taking money, voting in national elections, and leaving tips at 
restaurants they never plan to visit again.  This anecdotal evidence is consistent with evidence 
from empirical studies of cooperation showing that individuals behave altruistically towards 
others in one-shot (i.e. non-iterated) social dilemmas.  Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) found 
that nearly 75% of individuals engaged in a one-shot social dilemma chose cooperation rather 
than defection following a 30-minutes acquaintance period.  Results from ultimatum games 
show similar results.  In a study investigating cooperation in the ultimatum game “Divide Ten 
Dollars”, it was found that most proposers generally offer a 50/50 split rather than proposing a 
greater amount for themselves (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994).  Similar cooperative 
results were found in ultimatum games by Guth and colleagues (Guth, Schmittberger, & 
Schwarze, 1982). 
 As Trivers (1971) noted, “many transgressions performed in private are likely to become 
public knowledge” (p. 50).  This suggests that altruistic or cooperative behavior might be 
motivated by reputation or indirect-reciprocity (contingent behavior based on local 
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information) (Alexander, 1987).  To test this notion, several studies have used double blind 
techniques to ensure that participants’ responses remained anonymous to both other 
participants as well as experimenters.  Generally these studies find that although cooperative 
behaviors decrease when one’s reputation is not at stake, these behaviors still remain present 
(Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). 
1.2 GUILT AND ALTRUISM 
It has been argued by emotion theorists and economists alike that emotions can serve as 
proximate mechanisms for altruistic behavior (Buck, 2002; Elster, 1998; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; 
Gintis, 2002).  Furthermore, it has been independently hypothesized by Frank (1988) and 
Hirshleifer (1987) that certain emotions allow for altruistic behaviors by competing with 
calculations stemming from rational self-interest.   
 One emotion in particular has been thought by emotions theorists to have specific 
altruistic functions: guilt (R. M. Nesse, 1990; Trivers, 1971).  Guilt has primarily been 
conceptualized as a negative (i.e. unpleasant) affective state resulting from a potentially 
objectionable action or inaction by the self.  Additionally, it is often accompanied by a 
preoccupation with the action/inaction as well as a pervasive desire to undo it (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, 1995). 
1.2.1 Contexts and Causes 
Guilt is generally seen as a social emotion that arises interpersonally, often in the context of 
shared values (Baumeister, 1998; Baumeister et al., 1994; Brooke, 1985; Millar & Tesser, 1988).  
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Furthermore, narrative data concerning guilt-inducing situations suggests that individuals feel 
guilty in social situations involving other-oriented empathic concern and connection 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney, 1992, 1995).  Taken together, these data highlight the 
importance of interpersonal contexts in the induction of guilt feelings. 
 In addition to interpersonal contexts, the literature focuses primarily on two specific 
causes of guilt feelings.  First, guilt arises in interpersonal situations in which harm, loss, and/or 
distress are inflicted on another individual (Baumeister et al., 1994).  The second, and possibly 
more crucial cause, is a sense of blameworthiness for the action/inaction inflicted on the other 
individual (De Rivera, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; McGraw, 1987; Shaver, 1985; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Tangney, 1991, 1992; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983).  That is, a transgression 
against another individual alone is not enough to induce guilt feelings in an individual.  One 
must also consider the impact of the transgression on the other individual within the 
interpersonal context.  Narrative studies examining first-person accounts of guilt-inducing 
situations find that moral transgressions provide a strong component for the induction of guilt 
feelings in participants (Baumeister et al., 1994; Berndsen, Pligt, Doosje, & Manstead, 2004; 
Ferguson, 1997; McGraw, 1987; Tangney, 1992). 
 In addition to interpersonal transgressions as a cause of guilt feelings in individuals, it 
has also been suggested that mere positive inequity can also bring about feelings of guilt 
(Baumeister et al., 1994).  That is, if one feels over-rewarded in an interpersonal context, guilt 
feelings may arise because 1) the individual feels as though they received more than they 
deserved, or 2) the individual feels as though their reward was at another individual’s expense.  
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The suggestion of guilt stemming from feelings of positive inequity comes from narrative 
studies (Baumeister et al., 1994) as well as studies of imagined scenarios (Austin, McGinn, & 
Susmilch, 1980; Hassebrauck, 1986). 
1.2.2 Consequences 
A widespread consensus exists in the literature concerning the consequences of guilt feelings.  
It is generally agreed that while guilt feelings are caused by transgressions, the moral, self-
conscious feeling of guilt motivates individuals to strengthen and reaffirm social relationships 
by engaging in reparative behaviors (Baumeister et al., 1994; Brock, 1969; Carlsmith & Gross, 
1969; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Higgins, 1987; Lewis, 
1993; Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972; Tangney, 1992, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; 
Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996).  Such reparative behaviors may include confession, 
apology, rectifying personal inequities, and/or helping behaviors. 
 Data from field experiments and phenomenological studies have shown that individuals 
who feel guilty are more likely to engage in helping behaviors than those who do not 
(Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Isen & Levin, 1972; 
Konecni, 1972; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Wicker et al., 1983).  Field experiments typically place 
participants in a situation in which they have an opportunity to help another individual after 
engaging in a guilt induction procedure.  These situations included such altruistic acts as helping 
a confederate pick up dropped papers (Cunningham et al., 1980; Isen & Levin, 1972; Konecni, 
1972) or groceries (Regan et al., 1972), as well as agreeing to donate blood (Darlington & 
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Macker, 1966).  Results of each of these studies demonstrate an increased frequency of helping 
behaviors in those participants who were engaged in guilt manipulations. 
 Similarly, empirical studies suggest that individuals who feel guilty are more agreeable 
to requests for altruistic deeds or compliance with research studies (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; 
Freedman et al., 1967; Harris, Benson, & Hall, 1975; McMillen, 1976; Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, 
& Fitzsimons, 2007).  Harris, Benson, and Hall (1975) observed men and women entering 
(guilty) and leaving (non-guilty) a catholic church during confession hours, recording the 
number of people donating and amount of each donation to the March of Dimes collectors.  It 
was generally found that the number of donations were greater for those individuals entering 
the church as compared to those leaving the church. 
 Carlsmith and Gross (1969) induced guilt by having subjects administer electric shocks to 
a confederate.  Following this procedure, participants were asked by a confederate to help 
recruit potential signers of a petition to save trees.  In comparison to control and sympathy 
induction conditions, participants engaged in the guilt induction were more likely to comply 
with this request. 
 A similar study conducted by Freedman, Wallington, and Bless (1967) induced guilt 
feelings in participants by placing them in a situation in which they were likely to lie to the 
experimenter.  It was found that those participants engaged in the guilt induction procedure 
were more likely to help a graduate student run a public opinions survey.  Interestingly, an 
additional experiment found that the effect of the guilt induction occurs primarily when the 
8 
 
participant is not acting towards the person with whom the participant feels guilty (Freedman 
et al., 1967). 
 Consistent results were found by McMillan (1976) in a study using a similar guilt 
induction procedure.  This study found that those participants who lied were more likely to help 
the experimenter circulate petitions.  Another study using the same guilt induction procedure 
found increase compliance in helping to score tests among those who felt guilty. 
 Finally, Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and Fitzsimons (2007) investigated the effects of 
nonconciously primed emotions (i.e. guilt and sadness) on helping behaviors.  It was found that 
those participants with nonconciously primed guilt were more likely to agree to give charitable 
donations.  These findings suggest that guilty individuals engage in more helping behaviors than 
sad individuals, even when these feeling aren’t accessible to conscious awareness. 
 Phenomenological studies examining first-hand descriptions of guilt-induced situations 
suggest similarly altruistic behaviors.  Reports examined by Wicker Payne, and Morgan (1983) 
as well as Lindsay-Hartz (1984) suggest that positive reparative actions are common in guilt-
inducted situations. 
 One significant limitation of these field and phenomenological studies is that they all 
involve face-to-face interactions with potential recipients of altruistic behaviors.  With such 
designs, it remains impossible to distinguish whether these altruistic acts were a result of 1) 
guilt feelings (as suggested), 2) the chance for future reciprocity, or 3) effects of participant 
reputation.  In exception, several studies have utilized methods from economic game theory in 
order to measure the effects of guilt and empathy.  The use of economic games yields potential 
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methodological advantages to field and phenomenological studies.  These methods have the 
potential to isolate the effects of guilt feelings by controlling for the effects of reputation by 
making interactions anonymous as well as controlling for the effects of reciprocity by specifying 
one-shot (non-iterated) games. 
 One study that controlled for effects of participant reputation was conducted by 
Ketelaar and Au (2003).  These investigators induced feelings of guilt to a subset of participants 
between rounds of a repeated social bargaining game (i.e. the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma).  It 
was found that those participants with induced feelings of guilt cooperated at higher levels 
than those participants in control conditions.  Furthermore, it was found that those participants 
who were uncooperative in initial rounds of the social bargaining game tended to show the 
largest effects of guilt manipulations in later rounds.  Although these results suggest that 
feelings of guilt motivate cooperative behavior, because this game was iterated, it remains 
unclear whether participants behaved altruistically as a result of guilt feelings or chance of 
reciprocity. 
 The effects of emotion induction were successfully isolated by controlling for both 
reputation and reciprocity in an investigation of the empathy-altruism hypothesis conducted by 
Batson and Moran (1999).  The empathy-altruism hypothesis (see Batson, 1991) states that in 
order to avoid feelings of guilt, an individual who feels empathy for another is altruistically 
motivated to increase the other’s welfare.  Empirical studies inducing empathy have generally 
supported this hypothesis in the context of varying economic games.  In a study testing the 
effects of induced empathy on allocations in a public-goods social dilemma conducted by 
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Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 1995), it was found that as empathy increased for an 
individual, so did the allocations given to that individual.  Also consistent with the empathy-
altruism hypothesis, a more recent study showed that induced empathy was related to 
increased rates of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Batson & Moran, 1999).  
This study, controlling for the effects of reciprocity (by implementing a one-shot social 
dilemma) as well as reputation (participants remained anonymous), provides the best evidence 
that emotions can influence altruistic behavior. 
However, even in light of this study it still remains unclear whether guilt (as opposed to 
empathy as avoidance of guilt) will result in similar altruistic effects.  In order to test this notion, 
a guilt induction (rather than an empathy induction) procedure would need to be conducted 
prior to an anonymous, one-shot social dilemma which similarly controls for the effects of 
reputation and reciprocity, respectively. 
 Interestingly, along with the widespread empirical evidence suggesting that guilt 
involves such approach-oriented behaviors such as reparation and confession of transgressions, 
there exists some evidence suggesting that guilt (at least in some specified contexts) may also 
motivate avoidance behaviors.  For example, in a previously mentioned study by Freedman, 
Wallington, and Bless (Freedman et al., 1967), it was found that although all 3 experiments 
showed that participants engaged in guilt manipulations complied more than controls, guilty 
participants complied more frequently when the requests did not involve interacting with the 
victim.  Based on these results, it has been suggested that facing the victim provides a guilt cue 
(i.e. an aversive state) that participants seek to avoid (Baumeister et al., 1994). 
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 In addition to these findings, it has also been suggested that individuals feeling guilt are 
reluctant to share these feelings with others.  In a study conducted by Notarius, Wemple, 
Ingraham, Burns, and Kollar (1982) examining the responses of guilty participants towards irate 
and unpleasant accusers, it was found that increased guilt was associated with lack of facial 
expressiveness.  These results dovetail nicely with Baumeister et al.’s (1994) suggestion that 
interactions with accusers act as guilt cues that individuals seek to avoid. 
 These two studies highlight the idea that guilt feelings induce a conflict between 
approach and avoidance behaviors.  Their results suggest that although guilty individuals are 
highly motivated to repair transgressions, they seek to do so without further induction of guilt 
feelings, primarily by avoiding further contact with the victims of their transgressions. 
 Taken together, these works yield a great amount of information regarding guilt feelings 
including context, causes, and consequences.  While some studies show that guilt can lead to 
avoidance behavior (Freedman et al., 1967; Notarius et al., 1982), in most cases when future 
contact is unavoidable, studies show a clear prosocial and altruistic effect.  Although these 
works suggest that guilt feelings increase altruistic behaviors, there does not exist empirical 
evidence of increased altruistic behavior of guilt-feeling individuals in situations that 1) do not 
involve kin, 2) allow no chance for future reciprocity, and 3) have no effect on reputation.  For 
example, many of the field studies finding positive associations between guilt induction 
procedures and altruistic acts required that the participant meet the potential recipient face-to-
face (e.g. Cunningham et al., 1980; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Isen & Levin, 1972; Konecni, 
1972; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Wicker et al., 1983).  In such studies, it is impossible to distinguish 
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whether these altruistic acts were due to 1) guilt manipulation procedures or 2) the effects 
possible future reciprocity and or reputation.  Without such empirical evidence, the altruistic 
effects found in previous studies cannot be solely attributed to guilt feelings. 
 The only study that has measured the effects of emotion in an anonymous, one-shot 
social situation was that conducted by Batson and Moran (1999).  This study differs from the 
proposed study in that empathy was manipulated rather than guilt.  As previously mentioned, 
the empathy-altruism hypothesis states that increased empathy results in an increased 
motivation to avoid feelings of guilt.  Thus, Batson and Moran (Batson & Moran, 1999) used a 
more indirect investigation of guilt than that of the proposed study. 
 To independently test the effects of guilt on altruistic behavior, participants engaged in 
guilt manipulations would need to be measured in situations with unrelated partners, 
controlling for the effects of reciprocity and reputation.  That is, the effects of guilt 
manipulations would need to be measured in anonymous, one-shot (i.e. non-iterated) social 
situations.  Accordingly, the proposed study will use an anonymous, double-blind variation of 
the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma on participants engaged in a guilt manipulation task.  Findings 
will advance the literature by measuring the association between guilt feelings and altruistic 
behavior in a situation that does not include additional variables known to increase altruistic 
behavior. 
 The proposed study will have implications for the conceptual understanding of the 
putative altruistic and prosocial effects of emotions on behavior.  The current literature on guilt 
focuses primarily on its relationship enhancing functions.  Erroneous attributions of guilt 
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feelings to such functions could have great implications for research on emotion, emotion and 
behavior regulation , and close relationships (Baumeister et al., 1994).  The proposed study 
aims to investigate the true, independent effects of guilt in a potentially altruistic social 
situation.  Such work may potentially aid in finding a place for altruism among current 
conceptualizations of social behavior. 
1.3 EXPERIMENTAL INDUCTION OF AFFECTIVE STATE 
Psychologists interested in emotion have used a variety of methods to vary the affective states 
of participants in order to measure their behavioral effects.    These include quasi-experimental 
methods such as 1) classification based on current affective state as assessed prior to 
examination, 2) the comparison of non-clinical participants with clinically diagnosed patients, 
and 3) the use of naturally occurring emotions based on environmental events (Gerrards-Hesse, 
Spies, & Hesse, 1994).  One limitation to these methods is the inability to standardize variables 
across participants. 
 In contrast to quasi-experimental procedures, the experimental induction of emotion 
manipulates affective state as an independent variable.  Gerrards-Hesse et al. (1994) have 
classified 5 groups of experimental induction procedures based on both stimulus and purpose 
of affective induction.  These include affective inductions based on the 1) mental generation of 
affective states, 2) mental generation of affective states with the instruction to re-experience 
the emotional state, 3) presentation of affective stimuli, 4) presentation of need-related 
emotional situations, and 5) generation of affectively relevant physiological states. 
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 Past research suggests that experimental affective inductions based on the guided 
mental generation of emotional state such as the Autobiographical Recollections Method 
(ARM) have been particularly effective (Goodwin & Williams, 1982).  This method instructs 
participants to recall salient past events pertaining to specific affective states, often times with 
the further instruction to relive the experience by writing a narrative transcription.  Brewer and 
colleagues (Brewer, Daughtie, & Lubin, 1980) conducted a study comparing the effectiveness of 
the ARM with control conditions including the well validated Velten mood induction procedure 
(Velten, 1968).  It was found that the ARM was more effective in producing negative moods as 
measured by the Depression Adjective Check List (Lubin, 1981), and the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Farbin, 1988). 
 Another advantage of the ARM is that in addition to general inductions of negative 
moods, it has been used to successfully induce several other specific affective states.  For 
example, Ketelaar and Au (2003) used the ARM involving writing a detailed description of an 
event to induce feelings of guilt in participants.  A similar variation of the ARM was used by 
Lerner and Keltner (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), to reliably induce feelings of fear and anger in 
participants. 
1.4 AFFECT AS INFORMATION 
It is interesting to note that although mood induction procedures such as the ARM are often 
induced with reference to previous experiences, the effects of these induced emotions effect 
current external situations within the laboratory.  That is, recollections of past affective states 
produce current effective states which, in turn, influence present conditions.  Originally 
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presented by Schwartz and Clore (1983b), the affect as information model was developed to 
explain the tendency of individuals to (mis)attribute negative affective states to external 
sources regarding motivations and behaviors.  More specifically, this model states that because 
negative affective states are so overwhelmingly salient and aversive, they may serve as ‘stand 
ins’ for current situations (T. Ketelaar & W. T. Au, 2003; Ketelaar & Todd, 2001; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990).  This interpretation explains the effects of seemingly irrelevant affective 
induction procedures on current motivations and behaviors which are widely shown in the 
affective literature (e.g. T. Ketelaar & W. T. Au, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983b). 
1.5 TWO-PERSON, TWO STRATEGY (2 x 2) MATRIX GAMES 
In order to examine the social functions of guilt, it is imperative to engage participants in a 
situation with the particular causes and consequences associated with guilt.  The various two-
person, two-strategy matrix games provide precise and simple models of social dilemmas in 
which emotions play a role in decision making processes.  It has been posited that several of 
these games (and analogues of these games) represent the specific problems that emotions 
function to solve (Gibbard, 1990; R. Nesse, 1999; R. M. Nesse, 1990; Trivers, 1971). 
To this end, two-person, two-strategy games have been widely used in the literature to 
tap into the functions of a variety of emotions (e.g. Batson & Moran, 1999; T. Ketelaar & W. T. 
Au, 2003; Trivers, 1971) and even emotion related disorders (see Colman & Wilson, 1997).  
Exactly 78 of such games exist, 12 of which are ordinally distinct, symmetric 2 x 2 games 
(Rapoport & Guyer, 1966).  Of these 12 games, 4 unique archetypal 2 x 2 games remain: The 
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Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), Chicken (or Hawk/Dove) (Maynard-Smith, 1982; 
Russell, 1959), Leader (Rapoport, 1967a), and Hero (Luce & Raiffa, 1957) games. 
The preferences for the 4 games range from 1 (least preferred outcome) to 4 (most 
preferred outcome).  One player chooses a row (representing either cooperation or defection) 
while the other player simultaneously chooses a column (representing either cooperation or 
defection).1  Which one of the four possible outcomes shown in each matrix is contingent upon 
both players’ choices.  If both players cooperate, they both get R, the reward for mutual 
cooperation.  If one player cooperates but the other defects, the cooperating player gets S, 
suckers payoff, while the defecting player gets T, temptation to defect.  If both defect, both get 
P, punishment for mutual defection.  The crucial distinction between these games lies primarily 
in the relationships between these four possible outcomes. 
1.5.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The prisoner’s dilemma is named after the anecdote that was originally used to illustrate it (see 
Table 1.1).  In this scenario, two prisoners are held in separate cells after having been arrested 
for a major crime that they are guilty of committing.  The prosecutor has only enough evidence 
to convict them of a minor offense, for which the punishment is 1 year in jail.  Each prisoner is 
then given the choice of confessing or remaining silent.  If one confesses (defects) while the 
other remains silent (cooperates), the confessor will be released without imprisonment, while 
the other is sentenced to 20 years in prison.  If both confess, the two prisoner’s get an 
                                                            
1 It has been argued that the terms cooperation and defection are not applicable to all economic games (see Brosig & 
Colman, 2004).  Thus, following other works, in the description of these economic games, the current proposal 
defines cooperation as a strategic choice maximizing joint gain and defection as a strategic choice maximizing 
individual gain (Guyer & Rapoport, 1974). 
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intermediate sentence of 5 years in jail.  Each makes a choice without knowing what the other 
prisoner will choose.  The outcome of what will happen to both prisoners is jointly dependent 
on the decisions of each.  The dilemma arises because no matter what the other prisoner does, 
the best action is to confess.  If Prisoner A confesses and Prisoner B also confesses, Prisoner A 
gets 5 years in jail (as opposed to 20 years in jail if Player A remained silent).  If Prisoner A 
confesses and Prisoner B remains silent, Prisoner A gets 0 years in jail (as opposed to 1 year in 
jail if Prisoner A remained silent). 
Table 1.1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  
Prisoner A 
  
CONFESS REMAIN SILENT 
Prisoner B 
CONFESS 5 years for each 
0 years for B, 
20 years for A 
REMAIN SILENT 
20 years for A, 
0 years for B 
1 year for each 
 
The formal Prisoner’s Dilemma requires that the preference for the four possible 
outcomes be T>R>P>S.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma also assumes that the players cannot get out of 
the dilemma by forming another cooperative venture, namely taking turns exploiting one 
another.  This second condition will be satisfied as long as 2R>S+T.  These two criteria define 
the formal Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984). 
1.5.2 Strategies 
Defection is the dominant strategy in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game making mutual 
defection a dominant-strategy equilibrium (Lipman, 1986).  This is a result of the fact that each 
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player will receive a larger payoff by defecting regardless of whether their partner chooses to 
cooperate or defect in return.  This is not true in one-shot Chicken, Leader, and Hero games, 
which have no single dominant strategy.  In each of these games there exist two Nash 
equilibria, namely, Player A defecting while Player B cooperates, and vice versa. 
One advantage of two-person, two-strategy matrix games in the study of emotions on 
altruism decision making is that they provide a method of measuring the effects of mood on 
decision making without communication.  Although this aspect limits the ecological validity of 
the proposed study, it allows for the isolation of mood effects, controlling for the possible 
influences of factors inherent to communication, such as speech, prosody, and facial 
expression. In other words, this permits a focus on the influences of the internal affective 
dimension of an emotional experience rather than the social signaling dimension.  While each 
dimension is potentially of great interest, the focus here is to test hypotheses aimed specifically 
at the internal feeling state as likely to influence decision making.  Additionally, this approach 
allows for anonymous participation.  This is imperative for the proposed study, as it allows for 
the investigation of cooperation without having to account for the effects of reputation. 
Of the four archetypal 2 x 2 games, the proposed study requires a game with specific 
properties.  The use of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game has several conceptual and 
methodological advantages.  Most importantly, it presents participants with a non-zero sum 
situation, ideal for the measurement of decision making.  Second, one Nash equilibria exists for 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (unlike the Chicken, Leader, and Hero games); defection.  Thus, 
participants’ decisions can be attributed solely on mood, rather than the anticipation of a 
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particular response by their partner.  Third, decisions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game are highly 
relevant to the social emotion of guilt.  This is in contrast to the Chicken game, for example, 
which involves each player attempting to prevail over the other by instilling fear (Rapoport, 
1964; Snyder, 1971). 
1.6 VARIABLES EFFECTING COOPERATION RATES IN THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
1.6.1 Payoff Matrix 
Previous research has shown that the rate of cooperation observed in the iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma increases/decreases as a function of the payoff structure specified in the game (Sally, 
1995).  Numerous indices of cooperation have been presented within the literature (Bonacich, 
Shure, Kahan, & Meeker, 1976; Komorita, Sweeney, & Kravitz, 1980; Rapoport, 1967b; 
Rapopport & Chammah, 1965a).  Experimental findings from these studies generally suggest 
that 1) cooperation rates increase as R and S increase and 2) cooperation rates decrease as T 
and P increase (see Table 1.2).  For example, Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) created seven 
variants of the Prisoner’s Dilemma by manipulating payoff matrices.  The expected cooperation 
rates of these variants were then calculated based on interval ratios.  It was found that one 
such interval ratio: r = (R – P)/(T – S) produced expected cooperation rates associated with 
experimental data.  These ranged from an average 26.8% cooperation rate for an r of 1/50 to an 
average cooperation rate of 72.3 for an r of 1/2.  Other indices of payoff matrices have also 
been shown to be greatly associated with cooperation rates (see Bonacich et al., 1976). 
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Table 1.2 The Formal Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  
Prisoner A 
  
CONFESS REMAIN SILENT 
Prisoner 
B 
CONFESS 
R=3, R=3 Reward for 
mutual cooperation 
S=0, T=5 Sucker's 
payoff, and 
temptation to defect 
REMAIN 
SILENT 
T=5, S=0 Temptation 
to defect and sucker's 
payoff 
P=1, P=1 Punishment 
for mutual defection 
 
1.6.2 Group Size (2-Person and N-Person Games) 
Empirical studies investigating the relationship between group size and rate of cooperation in 
N-person (N > 2) Prisoner Dilemma games have universally found that as the size of the group 
increases, the rate of cooperation decreases (R. M. Dawes, 1980).  It should be noted, however, 
that several studies have compared cooperation rates of N-person games which varied in other 
potentially confounding ways (e.g. payoff structure).  For example, Marwell and Schmitt (1972) 
found lesser rates of cooperation in 3-person Prisoner Dilemma games than 2-person Prisoner 
Dilemma games, though with unequated payoff structures.  Similar studies have shown lower 
rates of cooperation in 3- and 6-person Prisoner Dilemma games than in comparable 2-person 
Prisoner Dilemma games (Bixenstine, Levitt, & Wilson, 1966; Rapopport & Chammah, 1965a). 
 The clearest evidence of the independent effect of group size on rate of cooperation 
was shown by Bonacich and colleagues (Bonacich et al., 1976).  Data from a comparison within 
a larger study examined cooperation rates in 3-, 6-, and 9-person Prisoner Dilemma games with 
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equated payoff structures.  Consistent with other experimental results, it was found that the 
rate of cooperation decreased as group size increased.  One possible interpretation of these 
results is that the temptation to defect should increase in relation to group size because the 
harm from defection would be diffused among a greater number of individuals (see R. M. 
Dawes, 1980).  Such interpretations have obvious societal implications. 
1.6.3 Communication 
Several studies have demonstrated that economic games allowing various forms of 
communication substantially increase rates of cooperation in comparison to games allowing 
little or no communication (Bixenstine et al., 1966; Brechner, 1977; R. Dawes, 1980; Edney & 
Harper, 1978, 1979; Jerdee & Rosen, 1974; Rapoport, Chammah, Dwyer, & Gyr, 1962).  This 
finding has been particularly noted by Dawes and colleagues (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 
1977) as well as Loomis (1959). 
 Dawes et al. (1977) compared rates of cooperation among 4 groups: 1) those that could 
not communicate, 2) those permitted to communicate only about topics irrelevant to the game, 
3) those permitted to communicate about topics relevant to the game without declaring 
intentions, and 4) those permitted to communicate about topics relevant to the game as well as 
declare intended decisions.  Results showed that as the level of communication increased, so 
did the level of cooperation, eliciting cooperation rates of 30%, 32%, 72%, and 71% respectively 
for each of the 4 groups.  Significant differences between groups 2 and 3 suggest that relevant 
communication greatly enhances the rate of cooperation.  Interestingly, results also suggest 
that the ability to declare intentions does not contribute beyond this.  Consistent with these 
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results, Loomis (1959) found higher rates of cooperation in groups permitted to exchange notes 
with prewritten promises of cooperation in comparison to groups not given permission to 
exchange notes. 
1.6.4 Anonymity 
Due to the influences of reputation and social desirability, it has generally been hypothesized 
that those individuals whose identity is public in economic games will cooperate at higher rates 
than those whose identity remains anonymous or private.  This hypothesis was tested directly 
by Fox and Guyer (1978).  This study engaged participants in one of two conditions of a 4-
person, iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  In the first condition, labeled public choice, 
participants were introduced to each other prior to the experiment, were able to see each 
other during the experiment, and were informed of each other’s choices after each trial.  In the 
second condition, labeled anonymous choice, subjects had no introduction, were unable to see 
each other during the course of the experiment, and were not informed of each other’s choices 
after each trial.  Results showed that, on average, participants in the public choice condition 
cooperated at a 12% higher rate in comparison to those in the anonymous choice condition.  
Similar effects of anonymity have been found by Bixenstine et al. (1966) and Jerdee and Rosen 
(1974). 
1.6.5 Sex 
Several studies have examined data from economic games regarding sex differences.  One of 
the most straightforward of these investigations was conducted by Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965b).  This study compared the rates of cooperation in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with 
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varied payoff structures between groups comprised of only men, only women, and both men 
and women.  The most striking group differences were between cooperation rates of groups 
comprised of two men and groups comprised of two women, which were 59% and 34% 
respectively.  Cooperation rates in the mixed groups were around 50%.  These results suggest 
that in iterated PD games, men cooperate with same sex partners at higher rates than women 
cooperate with same sex partners. 
1.6.6 Repetition (On-shot, Finitely Repeated and Infinitely Repeated Games 
Specific predictions in the areas of game theory (see Axelrod, 1984) and behavioral ecology (see 
Trivers, 1971) state that rates of cooperation will be greater in situation of infinitely repeated 
interactions that in one-shot (single trial) interactions.  These predictions are based on the 
notion that the opportunity to punish defectors and reward cooperators decreases the 
temptation to defect in early interactions.  These prediction have been supported convincingly 
by the success of “tit for tat” strategies in repeated social interactions (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod 
& Hamilton, 1981). 
 These predictions change dramatically when the number of interactions is specified (i.e. 
in finitely repeated interactions).  As noted by Luce and Raiffa (1957) and others (e.g. Axelrod, 
1984), if the last trial of a repeated set of interactions is known, defection becomes the 
dominant strategy in that final interaction (as there is no chance for retribution in subsequent 
interactions).  Once it is recognized by players that a defective response is virtually assured on 
the last trial, the second to last trial becomes, strategically, the last trial then the third to last, 
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and fourth to last, etc.  This notion of backward induction results in an equilibrium in which all 
trials elicit defection in all players. 
 The experimental research only partially supports these specific predictions.  Studies by 
Murnighan and Roth (Murnighan & Roth, 1983; Roth & Murnighan, 1978) manipulated the 
probability that a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction would continue in order to examine 
changes in rates of cooperation.  Results from these studies found that the probability of 
continuing (set at .895, .5, or .105) interacted with game payoff structures to affect the rate of 
cooperation, with higher probabilities resulting in greater rates of cooperation.  A similar 
association between repetition and rate of cooperation was found by Gallo and McClintock 
(Gallo & McClintock, 1965). 
 Contrary to these results, a review conducted by Kreps and colleagues (Kreps, Milgrom, 
Roberts, & Wilson, 1982)  found that rates of cooperation decreased as the number of trials 
increased.  Similarly, a meta-analysis conducted by Sally (1995) found lower cooperation rates 
in repeated games in comparison to one-shot games.  Additional analyses related to the payoff 
structure of the repeated games included within the meta-analysis led the author to suggest 
that the temptation to defect may be balance by the continuous influence of positive reward as 
well as the group loss of the benefits of mutual cooperation. 
1.6.7 Expectations of Other’s Behavior 
Several studies have collected data pertaining to participants’ expectations of partners’ 
behavior (e.g. Dawes et al., 1977; Frank et al., 1993; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Messe & Sivacek, 
1979).  Because these data are often collected after engagement in the economic game, it has 
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been argued that they have little bearing on the effect of these expectations on one’s own 
behavior (Acevedo & Krueger, 2005). 
One study, conducted by Acevedo and Krueger (2005), engaged participants in multiple 
rounds of the Prisoner’s Dilemma against a computerized opponent.  The probability of 
reciprocity was manipulated in several conditions ranging from .5 (a lack of reciprocity) to 1.0 
(complete reciprocity).  The authors hypothesized that greater likelihoods of reciprocity would 
elicit higher rates of cooperation.  Indeed, the results showed that the rate of cooperation 
increased monotonically with the probability of reciprocity, suggesting that individuals account 
for other’s behavior when playing economic games when this information is available. 
1.7 AIMS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
The aim of the proposed study is to examine the ways in which a specific social emotion (i.e. 
guilt) influences altruistic behavior in anonymous, one-shot social dilemmas.  More specifically, 
the proposed study will examine rates of cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
in women after engaging participants in a guilt mood induction procedure.  These cooperation 
rates will then be compared to those given a neutral mood induction procedure.  The current 
study will include only women as they provide a more convenient sample and, based on past 
research, tend to cooperate less frequently with one another than male-male or male-female 
dyads.  Additionally, participants will be asked to predict their partner’s behavior prior to 
deciding whether or not to cooperate with their partner.  Stemming from works suggesting that 
the function of guilt is to motivate individuals to repair violations of moral rules, it is 
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hypothesized that those individuals engaged in the guilt induction procedure will cooperate at 
higher levels than those participants engaged in neutral mood induction procedures.  
 If it is found that individuals engaged in a guilt induction procedure behave altruistically 
at greater rates than those engaged in a neutral mood induction procedure, it would suggest 
that subjective feelings of guilt increase altruistic behavior.  Alternatively, if it is found that the 
rates of cooperation are similar between groups, it would suggest that subjective feelings of 
guilt and anger have little effect on cooperative behavior in anonymous, one-shot social 
situations. 
2.0 METHODS 
2.1 DESIGN AND OVERVIEW 
The current study used a posttest-only control group design.  There was a single, between-
subjects variable (Group) with two levels (Guilty and Control) as well as a within-subjects 
variable (Time) with three levels. 
2.2 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 120 female undergraduates enrolled at a large university who participated in 
partial fulfillment of requirements for their Introductory Psychology course.  Mean as was 18.55 
years (SD = .860).  The majority of participants were Caucasian (80.8%), with the remainder 
describing themselves as Asian (11.7%), African American (5.8%), biracial (.8%), and other (.8%).  
There were no group differences regarding age or race (all p’s > .10). 
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2.3 MEASURES 
2.3.1 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
Participants were instructed to rate the intensity of 6 subjective emotions (Guilty, Happy, Sad, 
Angry, Disgusted, and Fearful) by marking an X on a VAS measuring 3.5 inches from center to 
each of two endpoints (Not at all to Extremely) representing how strongly they felt each 
emotion at that very moment.  The visual analogue scale was scored from 0 to 7, with 0 being 
indicative of the minimum amount of subjective emotion and 7 being indicative of the 
maximum amount of subjective emotion.  A score of 3.5 occurred at the midway point.  These 
subjective emotion ratings were taken at three specific time points: 1) prior to engaging in the 
mood induction procedure (see below), 2) directly following the mood induction procedure, 
and 3) following the Prisoner’s Dilemma Interaction. 
2.4 MOOD INDUCTION 
After providing initial ratings of subjective emotion, participants were instructed to write a 
detailed description of an event for a period of 10 minutes.  In addition to this written 
description, participants were specifically instructed to allow themselves to take on the feelings 
that were present at that time during the mood induction procedure. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: guilt and neutral.  Those 
participants assigned to the guilt condition (experimental) were instructed to write a detailed 
description of a recent event that made them feel guilty, ashamed, or self-blaming [this guilt 
induction procedure was used by Ketelaar and Au (2003) and adapted from Schwarz and Clore 
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(1983a)] (See Appendix B).  Those participants assigned to the neutral condition (control) were 
instructed to write a detailed description of a typical school day (See Appendix A). 
2.5 PRISONER’S DILEMMA INTERACTION 
Completion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Interaction consisted of three separate questions asked 
of each participant.  The first question required each participant to predict the decision that 
their partner would make; either to cooperate or to defect.  The second question required each 
participant to rate how confident they were in this prediction on a 7-point, likert-type scale.  
Finally, each participant was required to state their decision; either to cooperate or defect with 
their partner. 
 It was hypothesized that those participants given the guilt induction procedure would 
cooperate at higher rate than those participants given the neutral induction.  To minimize 
ceiling effects in the comparison between guilt and neutral inductions, a payoff matrix intended 
to elicit low rates of cooperation was chosen (See Table 3).  This payoff matrix produced 
cooperation rates of 45.8% in iterated games conducted by Rapoport and Chammah (1965). 
Table 2.3 Monetary Payoff Structure for the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  
Prisoner A 
  
CONFESS REMAIN SILENT 
Prisoner 
B 
CONFESS 
$4.00 Player A, $4.00 
Player B 
$1.00 Player A, $6.00 
Player B 
REMAIN 
SILENT 
$6.00 Player A, $1.00 
Player B 
$3.50 Player A, $3.50 
Player B 
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 The total payoff given to participants consisted of 1) game earnings from the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma interaction, as well as 2) a random amount of money generated by the computer.  
(Participants were not informed of the upper and lower limits of this random amount of money, 
but were told that it could be positive or negative.)  The purpose of this random sum of money 
was to ensure that each participant’s response remained anonymous to the experimenter.  The 
experimenter was only aware of the total payoff of each participant (in order to allocate 
earnings).  Thus, it was impossible for the experimenter to infer each participant’s behavior 
based solely on their total payoff. 
2.6 PROCEDURE 
Upon arrival to the study, each participant was seated in a separate room and given a consent 
form to review and an initial set of subjective emotion ratings.  Following the completion of the 
consent form, two questionnaires and subjective emotion ratings, the principle investigator 
gave each participant a detailed briefing of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game to be played 
with their partner.  This detailed briefing included a description of 1) the decisions that each 
participant as well as their partner would be asked to make (i.e. to cooperate or defect), 2) the 
specific monetary payoffs resulting each possible outcome from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and 3) 
a description and justification of the random number of dollars given to each participant.  
During this time, and throughout the experiment, efforts were made to ensure that participants 
were never to come face to face with one another. 
 Once the Prisoner’s Dilemma game had been described to both participants, each was 
given the mood induction procedure.  Participants were instructed to read the directions 
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carefully prior to writing their responses.  Additionally, participants were asked to remain 
focused on the personal event even if they were to finish the written response prior to the end 
of the 10 minute segment.  Participants were given the second set of subjective emotion ratings 
directly following the mood induction procedure. 
 Participants were then seated, one directly following the other, to answer the three 
questions (see above) pertaining to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Directly after finishing the 
game, both participants were given a third and final set of subjective emotion ratings.  Finally, 
each participant was given a total payoff consisting of game earnings and the random sum as 
well as a debriefing sheet explaining the aims of the study. 
3.0 RESULTS 
3.1 PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
Descriptive data regarding subjective emotion ratings by group can be found on Table 3.1 (See 
Figures  1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for graphical representations of subjective guilt, happiness, anger, 
sadness, and disgust feelings, respectively).  Subjective emotion ratings at three time points 
were independently analyzed for both Guilt and Happiness using mixed repeated-measures 
ANOVA’s with experimental condition (Control or Guilt) as a between-subjects factor.  Each 
used an alpha level of 0.05.  (Ratings of Sadness, Anger, Disgust, and Fear were highly 
correlated with ratings of Guilt and thus were not included in further preliminary analyses). 
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Table 3.1 Subjective Emotion Ratings by Group and Time 
 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Total 
  M SD M SD M SD M 
Group 
       Guilty 
       Control 0.84a 1.24 0.74a 1.02 1.15a 1.35 0.91 
Experimental 0.83a 1.15 3.52b 1.68 2.12c 1.68 2.16 
Happy 
       Control 3.97a 1.07 3.73a 1.43 3.69a 1.43 3.80 
Experimental 4.34a 1.11 2.77b 1.50 3.42c 1.40 3.51 
Sad 
       Control 1.50a 1.42 1.47a 1.43 1.35a 1.34 1.44 
Experimental 1.31a 1.40 3.04b 1.77 1.82a 1.57 2.06 
Angry 
       Control 0.74a 1.19 1.03a 1.32 0.81a 0.93 0.86 
Experimental 0.61a 0.86 2.44b 1.96 1.17c 1.45 1.41 
Disgusted 
       Control 0.62a 1.18 0.78a 1.20 0.83a 1.19 0.74 
Experimental 0.33a 0.63 2.30b 2.06 1.29c 1.62 1.31 
Fearful 
       Control 1.31a 1.62 0.85b 1.23 1.18a,b 1.28 1.11 
Experimental 0.81a 1.17 1.28a,b 1.66 1.55b 1.84 1.21 
Total 
       Control 1.50 1.29 1.43 1.27 1.50 1.25 1.48 
Experimental 1.37 1.05 2.56 1.77 1.90 1.59 1.94 
        Total 1.43 1.17 2.00 1.52 1.70 1.42 1.71 
 
3.1.1 Guilt Ratings as a Function of Experimental Group 
A significant main effect of experimental condition was found, F(1, 106) = 31.544, p < .001, 
suggesting that, averaged over time, those participants in the experimental condition reported 
more intense feelings of guilt than those in the control condition.  A significant main effect of 
time was also found, F(2, 212) = 41.728, p < .001, suggesting that, averaged over experimental 
condition,  participants reported significantly different intensities of subjective guilt feelings 
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over time.  Post-hoc Bonferroni tests (at p < .05) were conducted to examine further the effect 
of time.  These pairwise comparisons found that, averaged over experimental condition, 
subjective emotion ratings were different at all 3 time points.  It was found that mean 
subjective emotion ratings at time 1 (0.840), time 2 (2.064), and time 3 (1.518) significantly 
differed from one another. 
 The interaction effect between the repeated measures factor time and experimental 
condition was also statistically significant, F(2, 212) = 50.547, p < .001.  Similar to the main 
effect of time, post-hoc Bonferroni tests (at p < .05) were conducted to examine further this 
interaction. 
 Regarding participants in the control group, mean subjective guilt ratings did not differ 
at any two time points (all p’s > .10).  The highest mean guilt ratings were found at time 3 
(1.045) (which did not significantly differ from time 1 or time 2), followed by time 1 (.847) 
(which did not significantly differ from time 2 or time 3), followed by time 2 (.738) (which did 
not significantly differ between time 1 or time 3). 
 For participants within the experimental group, pairwise comparisons found that all 
mean subjective guilt ratings differed from one another (all p’s < .001).  In contrast to those in 
the control group, the highest mean guilt ratings were found at time 2 (3.389), followed by time 
3 (1.991), followed by time 1 (.833). 
 In summary of the effects of guilt on condition, it was found that subjective guilt ratings 
increased significantly between time 1 and time 2 only within the experimental group.  No 
significant difference was found in guilt ratings between time 1 and time 2 within the control 
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group.  This suggests that the guilt induction procedure was indeed successful in the induction 
of guilt feelings. 
3.1.2 Happiness Ratings as a Function of Experimental Group 
A significant main effect of experimental condition was not found F(1, 107) = 1.286, p = .259, 
suggesting that, averaged over time, participants in the control and experimental conditions 
reported subjective feelings of happiness similarly. 
 A significant main effect of time was found, F(2, 214) = 34.478, p < .001, suggesting that, 
averaged over experimental condition, participants reported significantly different intensities of 
subjective happiness feelings over time.  Post-hoc Bonferroni tests (at p < .05) were conducted 
to examine further the effect of time.  These pairwise comparisons found that, averaged over 
experimental condition, subjective emotion ratings were different at all 3 time points.  It was 
found that mean subjective emotion ratings at time 1 (4.158), time 2 (3.328), and time 3 (3.614) 
significantly differed from one another. 
 The interaction effect between the repeated measures factor time and experimental 
condition was also statistically significant, F(12, 214) = 17.255, p < .001.  Similarly to subjective 
guilt ratings, regarding participants in the control condition, mean subjective happiness ratings 
did not differ at any two time points (all p’s > .10).  The highest mean happiness ratings were 
found at time 1 (3.975), followed by time 3 (3.765), followed by time 2 (3.741).  Also similarly to 
subjective guilt ratings, regarding participants in the guilt condition, pairwise comparisons 
found that all mean subjective happiness ratings differed from one another (all p’s < .001).  The 
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highest mean happiness ratings were found at time 1 (4.340), followed by time 3 (3.463), 
followed by time 2 (2.916). 
 In summary of the effects of happiness on condition, it was found that subjective 
happiness ratings decreased significantly between time 1 and time 2 only within the 
experimental group.  No significant difference was found in guilt ratings between time 1 and 
time 2 within the control group. 
3.2 PRIMARY ANALYSES 
Preliminary analyses concerning subjective ratings of guilt and happiness as a function of 
experimental group suggest that the procedure for inducing guilt was indeed an effective 
experimental manipulation.  With these findings, we were in good shape to test the primary 
hypothesis concerning group differences in rates of cooperation.  As previously stated, it was 
hypothesized that those participants within the experimental (guilt) group would cooperate at 
higher rates than those participants in the control (neutral) group.   Contrary to this hypothesis, 
a binary logistic regression model contrasting the rate of cooperation in the two conditions did 
not reveal a significant effect for group, chi-square (1, N = 109) = .081, p = .776 (odds ratio = 
1.115).  Together with preliminary analyses suggesting the effective manipulation of emotion 
following the mood induction procedure, this finding suggests that guilt feelings do not increase 
an individual’s propensity to cooperate with others in anonymous, one-shot situations. 
 In light of this primary analysis, it is possible that the effect of group would only be 
shown among those individuals in the experimental condition who reported high levels of guilt.  
In this, participants in the experimental group were divided by self-reported subjective guilt 
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ratings at Time 2 into two groups: 1) those with self-reported subjective guilt ratings greater 
than two standard deviations above the mean at Time 1 and 2) those with self-reported 
subjective guilt ratings lesser than two standard deviations above the mean at Time 1.  A 
second binary logistic regression contrasting the rate of cooperation in the two conditions was 
conducted including only those participants in the guilt conditions with self-reported subjective 
guilt ratings at Time two greater than two standard deviations above the mean at Time 1.  In 
contrast to the primary hypothesis, this analysis also did not reveal a significant effect for 
group, chi-square (1, N=92) = .740, p = .390 (odds ratio = .878). 
 Additionally, because the hypothesized action tendencies resulting from guilt 
(reaffirming social bonds) are potentially in contrast with those of anger (punishment), an 
additional logistic regression model was conducted including the predictors of group, anger 
(Time 2), and the group x anger (Time 2) interaction.  Results of the analyses are shown in Table 
3.2.  Analyses suggested that group and the group x anger (Time 2) interaction were not 
significant.  In contrast, anger (Time 2) significantly contributed to the model, suggesting that 
when controlled for group, subjective anger ratings at time 2 were predictive of cooperation 
rates. 
Table 3.2 Binary Logistic Regression Analysis 
Predictor B Wald chi-square P Odds Ratio 
Group -0.973 2.709 0.100 0.378 
Anger (Time 2) -0.348 4.708 0.030 0.706 
Anger (Time 2) x Group 0.346 1.411 0.235 1.414 
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3.3 SECONDARY ANALYSES 
As mentioned in the preliminary analyses, the guilt induction procedure not only resulted in 
significant changes in subjective guilt feelings, but also with each of the other measured 
emotions (happiness, anger, sadness, and disgust) aside from fear.  Furthermore, these affects 
were significantly correlated with one another (See Table 5).  Thus, two sets of secondary 
analyses were conducted.  The first set analyzed the effects of subjective ratings of guilt 
happiness, anger, sadness, and disgust at Time 2 on cooperation using binary logistic regression 
analyses.  These analyses were conducted for each emotion to examine effects of cooperation 
rates 1) among the entire sample, 2) within the experimental group, and 3) within the control 
group.  The second set of analyses consisted of an exploratory factor analyses to determine if 
there were one or more underlying composite affective states that might be related to 
cooperation rates. 
3.3.1 The Effect of Subjective Guilt on Cooperation Rate 
Subjective guilt ratings were not associated with rates of cooperation among the entire sample, 
chi-square (1, N=109) = 2.109, p = .146 (odds ratio = .865), nor were they associated with 
cooperation within the control group, chi-square (1, N=109) = .808, p = .369 (odds ratio = .789).  
Surprisingly, within the experimental group, subjective guilt ratings were associated with 
increased rates of defection, chi-square (1, N=109) = 4.639, p = .031 (odds ratio = .694). 
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Figure 3.1: Subjective Guilt Ratings by Group and Time 
3.3.2 The Effect of Subjective Happiness on Cooperation Rate 
Among the entire sample, subjective happiness ratings were predictive of increase rates of 
cooperation, chi-square (1, N=109) = 5.174, p =.023 (odds ratio = 1.348).  This effect was even 
stronger within the experimental group, chi-square (1, N=109) = 10.847, p = .001 (odds ratio = 
2.020).  In contrast, within the control group subjective happiness ratings were only moderately 
associated with rates of cooperation, chi-square (1, N=109) = .066, p = .797 (odds ratio = 1.051). 
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Table 3.3 Intercorrelations Among Independent and Dependent Variables 
    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Guilt 2.07 1.94 - 
        2 Happiness 3.35 1.51 **-0.43 - 
       3 Anger 1.61 1.69 **0.59 **-0.53 - 
      4 Sadness 2.12 1.74 **0.65 **-0.63 **0.61 - 
     5 Disgust 1.37 1.71 **0.60 **-0.35  **0.59  **0.45 - 
    6 Fear 1.00 1.37 **0.35 **-0.30  **0.53  **0.41  **0.49 - 
   7 Age 18.55 0.89   -0.08   -0.06   -0.02    0.03    0.06 -0.02 - 
  8 Prediction of Partners' Choice 4.21 1.36    -0.01    0.12   -0.04    0.08   -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 - 
 9 Choice 0.51 0.50   -0.14   *0.27   -0.15   -0.08   -0.04 -0.18  0.13 **0.47 - 
                          
Note: Emotion ratings taken from Time 2.  Correlations with Choice are point biserial. * 
indicates significant correlation at the .05 level.  ** indicates significant correlation at the .01 
level. 
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Figure 3.2: Subjective Happiness Ratings by Group and Time 
3.3.3 The Effect of Subjective Anger on Cooperation Rate 
Among the entire sample, subjective anger ratings were not associated with rates of 
cooperation, chi-square (1, N=109) = 2.410, p =.121 (odds ratio = .836), nor were they 
associated with cooperation rates within the control condition, chi-square (1, N=109) = .000, p = 
.993 (odds ratio = .998).  When examined only within the experimental condition, it was found 
that subjective anger ratings were predictive of increased rates of defection, chi-square (1, 
N=109) = 5.082, p = .024 (odds ratio = .706). 
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Figure 3.3: Subjective Anger Ratings by Group and Time 
3.3.4 The Effect of Subjective Sadness on Cooperation Rate 
Among the entire sample, subjective sadness ratings were not associated with rates of 
cooperation, chi-square (1, N =109) = .743, p = .389 (odd ratio = .908), nor were they associated 
with cooperation rates within the control condition, chi-square (1, N=109) = .458, p = .499 (odds 
ratio = 1.149).  When examined only within the experimental condition, it was found that 
subjective sadness ratings were predictive of increased rates of defection, chi-square (1, N=109) 
= 3.986, p = .046 (odds ratio = .723). 
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Figure 3.4: Subjective Sadness Ratings by Group and Time 
3.3.5 The Effect of Subjective Disgust on Cooperation Rate 
Among the entire sample, subjective disgust ratings were not associated with rates of 
cooperation, chi-square (1, N=109) = .183, p = .669 (odds ratio = .953).  Similarly, no 
associations were found within the experimental group, chi-square (1, N=109) = .182, p =.670 
(odds ratio = .941), or within the control group, chi-square (1, N=109) = .381, p = .537 (odds 
ratio = .844). 
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Figure 3.5: Subjective Disgust Ratings by Group and Time 
3.3.6 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Prior to conducting the exploratory factor analysis, the factorability of the 6 emotion ratings 
was examined.  First, all of the emotion ratings were correlated with one another at either 
above .3 or below -3.  Second, communalities were all above .3, further confirming that each 
emotion rating shared some common variance with each of the other emotion ratings.  Given 
these indicators, emotions of guilt, happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, and fear were each 
included in the analysis. 
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Principle component analysis was used as the primary purpose of the factor analysis was 
to identify potential composite affective states.  The analysis yielded one factor, with initial 
eigenvalues showing this factor to explain 59.252% of the variance for the entire set of emotion 
ratings (See Table 8).  An approximately normal distribution was evident for the extracted 
factor which was well suited for parametric statistical analyses.  As such, the single extracted 
factor was then used to predict cooperation rates using a binary logistic regression 1) among 
the entire sample, 2) within the experimental group, and 3) within the control group. 
Table 3.4 Factor Loadings and Communalities Based on a Principle Component Analysis 
Emotion 
Factor 
Loading Communality 
      
Guilt 0.818 0.668 
Happy -0.712 0.507 
Sad 0.823 0.678 
Angry 0.843 0.710 
Disgusted 0.755 0.570 
Fearful 0.649 0.422 
Eigenvalue 3.555 - 
% of Variance 59.252 - 
      
 
Consistent with analyses concerning specific emotions, the extracted factor was not 
associated with rates of cooperation among the entire sample, chi square (1, N=109) = 3.518, p 
= .061 (odds ratio = .690), nor was it associated with cooperation rates within the control group 
(1, N=109) = .036, p = .850 (odds ratio = .925).  The extracted factor was associated with 
cooperation rates within the experimental group (1, N=109) = 9.553, p = .006 (odds ratio = 
.376). 
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4.0 DISCUSSION 
The aim of the current study was to examine the effects of induced guilt feelings on 
cooperation in a one-shot, anonymous social situation.  In the elicitation of guilt feelings, the 
autobiographical recollection method was used, which has been shown to be an effective mood 
induction procedure.  Additionally, the prisoner’s dilemma was used to isolate the effects of 
emotion, controlling for the altruistic tendencies resulting from reciprocal altruism and 
reputation, which have been shown to increase cooperation rates in previous works.  It was 
hypothesized that those participants who were given the guilt induction procedure would be 
more likely to cooperate than those participants who were given the neutral mood induction 
procedure.  Results did not support these hypothesized group differences.  Implications of this 
primary analysis in light of secondary analyses concerning subjective emotions ratings are 
discussed. 
 Although no group differences were found in the current study, careful inspection of 
subjective emotion ratings following the mood induction procedure suggest that it was not due 
to the ineffectiveness of the procedure itself.  Compared with similar studies measuring the 
effects of guilt on cooperation in economic games (i.e. Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Batson and 
Moran, 1999), the current study induced comparable levels of subjective guilt. 
 Study 2 of Ketelaar and Au (2003) instructed participants to indicate self-reported guilt 
(as well as several other emotions) following proposals in an ultimatum game.  These ratings 
were reported on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (extremely).  On this integer-based 
likert-type scale, 24 individuals reported a guilt rating of 0, 7 individuals reported a guilt rating 
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of 1, 3 individuals reported a guilt rating of 3, and 2 individuals reported a guilt rating of 3.  Data 
regarding other emotions were not reported in the manuscript.  These self-reported guilt 
ratings were dichotomously recoded to represent 1) those individuals who felt no guilt and 2) 
those individuals who felt some guilt.  Ketelaar and Au (2003) found that those individuals who 
felt some guilt were more likely to make generous (as opposed to selfish) offers in a second 
ultimatum game. 
 Mean guilt ratings in the current study (control group = .73, guilt group = 3.39) compare 
favorably to those reported in Ketelaar and Au (2003) (control group = 0, guilt group = 1.58) 
though similar cooperative effects were not found in the current study.  This suggests that the 
intensity of guilt feelings induced in the current study was not too low to produce the 
hypothesized increase in rates of cooperation. 
 Batson and Moran (1999) instructed participants in low- and high-empathy conditions to 
indicate the degree to which they were currently feeling several empathy adjectives toward the 
other participant in a prisoner’s dilemma game.  These included sympathetic, warm, 
compassionate, softhearted, tender, and moved and were reported on a 7-point likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).  These adjectives were then averaged to form 
an index of self-reported empathy.  Mean guilt ratings in the current study (control group = .73, 
guilt group = 3.39) were slightly less intense when compared with those of Batson and Moran 
(1999) (low empathy condition = 3.50, high empathy condition = 5.10). 
 Within the entire sample a cooperation rate of 51.4% was found.  More specifically, 
within the control group, a cooperation rate of exactly 50% was found while in the 
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experimental group, a cooperation rate of 52.7% was found.  The 50% cooperation rate found 
within the control group was near the predicted rate of 45.8% (based on past studies using 
similar payoff matrices) stated in the methods section above.  Thus, the current study was 
successful in eliciting rates of cooperation within the control group which minimized ceiling 
effects in the comparison between guilt and neutral inductions. 
 Despite the current study’s successful induction of guilt feelings in the experimental 
group and cooperation rate within the control group, the primary hypothesis was not 
supported.  More specifically, it was not found that those participants in the experimental 
condition cooperated at higher rates than those participants in the control condition.  This 
finding is in contrast with the generally accepted view that guilt feelings increase rates of 
cooperation stemming from the current state of the literature. 
 In order to isolate the effects of reciprocal altruism and reputation, the current study 
was conducted in ways that differ from those with the closest methodologies.  These specific 
differences provide clues as to the reasons for which the current study may not have resulted in 
the expected findings.  Ketelaar and Au (2003), for example, successfully controlled for the 
effects of participant reputation by rendering their game anonymous.  An important difference 
between this study and the current one is that Ketelaar and Au (2003) used an iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma game, rather than a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game.  As a result, 
altruistic behaviors found in Ketelaar and Au (2003) could be the result of either reciprocal 
altruism, guilt, or some interaction between the two.  In contrast, the effects of guilt were 
carefully isolated within the current study.  Taken together, findings from Ketelaar and Au 
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(2003) and the current study suggest that, when isolated from the effects of reciprocal altruism, 
guilt does not have an effect on altruistic behavior. 
 Although both control for the effects of reciprocal altruism and reputation, the current 
study also differs from that of Batson and Moran (1999) in two important ways.  First, the mood 
induction procedure used in the current study was not directly related to the other individual 
playing the game.  Rather, and in accordance with the Affect as Information hypothesis 
(Schwartz &Clore, 1983b), the mood induction procedure related to people with whom the 
subject had interacted with in her past.  In contrast, the mood induction procedure used by 
Batson and Moran (1999) referred specifically to the subjects’ partners to be played with in the 
game.  Second, Batson and Moran (1999) measured the effects of empathy (as avoidance of 
guilt) while the current study measured the effects of guilt directly.  Taken together, findings 
from Batson and Moran (1999) and the current study suggest that although feelings of empathy 
can induce altruistic behavior in one-shot anonymous social situations, feelings of guilt cannot. 
 Although the guilt induction procedure was relatively effective in inducing feelings of 
guilt and reducing feelings of happiness, additional and unanticipated effects on other 
emotions were also found.  Ratings of 3 of the other negative emotions (i.e. sadness, anger, and 
disgust) were also significantly higher at Time 2 when compared to Time 1.  Secondary analyses 
examining effects of subjective guilt, happiness, anger, sadness and disgust were able to shed 
some light on specific effects. 
 Subjective guilt ratings showed no evidence of increasing cooperation rates.  In fact, 
subjective guilt ratings, as well as subjective ratings of anger and sadness were associated with 
48 
 
increased rates of defection within the experimental group (though not among the entire 
sample or within the control group).  Alternatively, subjective happiness ratings were 
associated with greater rates of cooperation among the entire sample as well as within the 
experimental group (but not within the control group).  In addition, results from the exploratory 
factor analysis yielded a single component of similar negative affects and opposing positive 
affect.  One interpretation of these findings is that in one-shot, anonymous social situations, 
negative affect may increase rates of defection while positive affect might increase rates of 
cooperation.  Regarding the effects of happiness, this interpretation would be consistent with 
empirical studies demonstrating a positive association between positive affect and altruistic 
behavior (Isen, Horn, & Rosenhan, 1973; Isen & Levin, 1972; Levin & Isen, 1975; Lu & Argyle, 
1991; Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973). 
It should be noted that ratings of subjective happiness predicted increased cooperation 
rates among the entire sample as well as within those participants given the guilt induction 
procedure.  Subjective happiness ratings did not predict cooperation among those participants 
given the neutral mood induction procedure.  It may be that subjective happiness ratings in the 
context of a negative mood induction procedure (as in the guilt induction procedure) better 
predict cooperation than baseline subjective happiness (as in the control condition).  Future 
research in the area of emotions and altruism should investigate the effects of specific 
emotions as well as global negative and positive affect in relation to altruistic behavior. 
 Several additional methodological limitations should also be taken into consideration in 
the interpretation of the current study’s findings.  As previously mentioned, the mood induction 
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procedure used in the current study elicited not only the hypothesized increase in guilt and the 
expected decrease in happiness, but also significant increases in anger, sadness, and disgust.  As 
a result, the mood induction procedure elicited an increase in generalized negative affect and a 
decrease in positive affect.  It is possible that emotion specific altruistic behaviors could be 
predicted with a more circumscribed mood induction procedure.  Future research should 
investigate the effects of both generalized positive and negative affect as well as specific 
emotions on altruism in certain context. 
 Participants were also asked to predict their partner’s behavior prior to making their 
decision to cooperate or defect.  Results showed that a partner predictions (cooperate or 
defect) were highly correlated with participant decision (cooperate or defect) (See Table 5.).  It 
is possible that by asking participants to make this prediction directly prior to their decision a 
cognitive bias towards the same decision as their partner might be activated.  Interpretation of 
the results must take this into consideration. 
 Furthermore, the current study selected specific variables concerning the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma that may differentially affect cooperation rates in those in guilt and neutral 
conditions.  These include group size, payoff matrix, as well as sex of participant.  Only specific 
studies isolating the effects of these independent factors could shed light on these possible 
interactions. 
 Another potential limitation of the current study relates to the conditions of anonymity.  
As mentioned in the methods section, the current study went to great lengths to insure that 
both the experimenter and other partner were blind to each participant’s choices.  This was 
50 
 
done by giving each participant a random sum of money in addition to the money that they 
earned playing the prisoner’s dilemma game.  It has been argued by Hoffman et al. (1996) that 
even in such double blind experiments, an implicit audience still remains.  That is, even in light 
of stakes to maintain anonymity, an implicit concern exists for what others may think of their 
behaviors.  Certainly, such double-blind conditions do not exist outside of the laboratory where 
“someone is always watching”. 
 Finally, the sample used in the current study was restricted only to college-aged 
females, due in part to convenience.  It remains possible that the inclusion of males or 
individuals of a broader age range might have affected the results. 
 In summary, the current study measured the effects of induced guilt on altruistic 
behavior in a one-shot, anonymous social situation.  Although primary analyses found no 
evidence regarding group differences in rates of cooperation, secondary analyses suggest that 
generalized negative affect may be associated with decreased rates of cooperation while 
positive affect may be associated with increased rates of cooperation.  Future research 
investigating the effects of general negative and positive affect as well as specifically induced 
emotions needs to be conducted to further evaluate this suggestion. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
NEUTRAL PERSONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 
 
Please write a description of a typical school day.  It will be most helpful to us if you take the 
time to describe this event as vividly and in as much detail as possible.  Please try to include 
some of the background information that led up to this event and to describe any immediate 
consequences. 
Make sure that you include the details of what happened, exactly how you felt at the time, why 
you felt this way, and what you thought about. 
You may find it helpful to take a few minutes before writing anything to remember this event as 
clearly as you can, to “get into the experience” so as to recall the event as it happened and how 
you felt at the time.  Write your description at the bottom of this page, and continue on the 
next several pages if necessary.  Please take the next 10 minutes for this task.  The 
experimenter will let you know when the 10 minutes is over.  If you finish early, go back and 
reread your description and add any forgotten details. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
GUILTY PERSONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 
 
Please write a description of a recent event, preferably within the past year, that made you feel 
really guilty, ashamed, and self-blaming.  It will be most helpful to us if you take the time to 
describe this event as vividly and in as much detail as possible.  Please try to include some of 
the background information that led up to this event and to describe any immediate 
consequences. 
Make sure that you include the details of what happened, exactly how you felt at the time, why 
you felt this way, and what you thought about. 
You may find it helpful to take a few minutes before writing anything to remember this event as 
clearly as you can, to “get into the experience” so as to recall the event as it happened and how 
you felt at the time.  Write your description at the bottom of this page, and continue on the 
next several pages if necessary.  Please take the next 10 minutes for this task.  The 
experimenter will let you know when the 10 minutes is over.  If you finish early, go back and 
reread your description and add any forgotten details. 
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